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31 August 1961

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005900190001-6

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS

25X1



3. Brazil. (*Page iii*)

25X1

5. Turkey: Military regime aims to influence 15 October elections while endorsing return to civil government. (*Page v*)

6. Ghana: Nkrumah's activities during lengthy visit to bloc strengthening domestic opposition to him. (*Page vi*)

7. Watch Committee Conclusions. (*Page vi*)

25X1

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

25X1



25X1

*Brazil: A joint session of the Brazilian congress voted overwhelmingly in the early hours of 31 August to amend the constitution so as to make Vice President Joao Goulart president of Brazil, but to set up a parliamentary system of government headed by a prime minister chosen by congress. A manifesto by the heads of the armed forces on 30 August had declared their opposition to Goulart's return "in the present situation." War Minister Denys, however, reportedly told ex-president Kubitschek on the same day that the military would accept 'the West German parliamentary form of government.'

Goulart is en route to Buenos Aires by way of Panama, Lima, and Santiago. He is scheduled to arrive in Buenos Aires on the evening of 31 August, where he will presumably

31 Aug 61

DAILY BRIEF

iii

25X1



make his final decision on whether or not to return to Rio de Janeiro. Should Goulart decide against an immediate return to Rio de Janeiro, his presence in Buenos Aires or Monte-video would make it convenient for him to go to his native state of Rio Grande do Sul, governed by his brother-in-law, Leonel Brizola.

Brizola, who has threatened to use force to back Goulart's right to the presidency, has the support of the armed forces in his state as well as the press and radio. The Third Army, with headquarters at Porto Alegre in Rio Grande do Sul, reportedly has orders to arrest the commander appointed by Denys to succeed General Machado Lopes. Brizola has also called for a "general mobilization" and has warned civilians to be ready to serve under Machado.

[On embarking for Europe, ex-president Janio Quadros stated that he was forced to resign but did not clarify who or what forces were responsible. Quadros' Justice Minister is said to believe that Quadros may in the near future release a statement which would link the United States to the external forces to which he alluded in his resignation. The American Consulate in Sao Paulo believes that the document may represent second-thought efforts by Quadros to find some scapegoat for his flight from responsibility which has been widely criticized in Brazil.]

25X1

25X1

31 Aug 61

DAILY BRIEF

iv

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005900190001-6

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25X1

25X1

Turkey. The ruling Committee of National Union (CNU) apparently has decided to continue restrictions on political activity during the campaign period prior to the 15 October election. The CNU hopes that Ismet Inonu's Republican People's party, which has long had good relations with Turkish military leaders, will win the election. The CNU probably regards continued restrictions as a means of strengthening Inonu's well-established party by holding down the newer parties, which appear to be gaining ground through appeals to former Prime Minister Menderes' adherents. There is strong feeling among military leaders that the actual polling on 15 October should be

OK

25X1

31 Aug 61

DAILY BRIEF

v

25X1

25X1

free, and that the country should be returned to civil government. Many of the same leaders, however, would favor retention of power by the military if Inonu's party did not win a majority in the election.

Menderes and his colleagues are scheduled to be sentenced on 15 September. If, as appears likely, Menderes and other top officials of the former regime receive the death sentence, public outbreaks may result, which would give the CNU added justification for restrictions on political activity during the campaign.

25X1

Ghana: An order by Nkrumah--who has been visiting Communist countries since 10 July--directing the immediate recruitment of 400 Ghanaian cadets for military training in the USSR has provoked a sharp reaction among moderate elements in Ghana. Ghanaian officials claim that the cadets are to be trained for an African high command, which the Casablanca powers hope to establish. Leading native officers of Ghana's British-led Army reportedly are strongly opposed to the order. It has also aroused the leaders of the right wing of the ruling Convention People's party, who have been engaged for some time in a power struggle with the party's militant left wing. The training plan seems certain to intensify conflict within the regime and could contribute to a coalescence of moderate forces which have become increasingly disenchanted with Nkrumah's leadership over the past several months.

25X1

(Backup, Page 3)

25X1

No

25X1

WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS

On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the United States Intelligence Board concludes that:

No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate direct military action in the immediate future.

25X1

25X1

31 Aug 61

DAILY BRIEF

vi

25X1

25X1

25X1

[Redacted]
[Redacted] Laos: Nothing significant has occurred to warrant changing last week's conclusion. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

31 Aug 61

DAILY BRIEF

vii

25X1

25X1

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Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005900190001-6

Bloc Training Plan Adds to Internal Discord in Ghana

[Nkrumah's arrangement with the USSR for the training of Ghanaian cadets is the most significant of a number of recent developments indicating an increasing orientation toward the Sino-Soviet bloc on the part of the Nkrumah regime. According to UK Acting High Commissioner Keeble in Accra, Nkrumah has indicated that 150 of the cadets are to be trained for the Ghanaian Air Force, 50 for Ghana's embryonic navy, and the balance for the army. Advertisements for applicants for the training positions were scheduled to start appearing in Ghanaian newspapers on 30 August, though with no mention being made of the foreign country where the training would take place. This formula was worked out by General Alexander, the British commander of Ghana's military forces, and the conservative presidential commission in charge of affairs in Ghana during Nkrumah's absence in order to buy time for an attempt to dissuade Nkrumah from implementing the arrangement. General Alexander has requested an early interview in Europe with Nkrumah who, in turn, has reportedly summoned one of the Ghanaian officers most outspokenly hostile to the plan.]

[If the training scheme materializes, Alexander appears determined to recommend the removal of the approximately 230 British officers now serving in the Ghanaian Army. The American Embassy in Accra believes their disappearance from the local scene might be followed by a revolt or attempted coup by Ghanaian officers, many of whom have been antagonistic toward Nkrumah for some time because of his Congo policy and rapprochement with the bloc. Keeble has indicated, however, that Britain's reaction to the training program would be most carefully considered.]

[News of the controversial training plan reached Ghana at a time when Nkrumah's standing at home was already at its lowest point, following several months of mounting domestic discontent and discord. The feud within the powerful Convention People's party--the backbone of the regime--has become increasingly bitter as essentially moderate "old guard" elements such

[redacted] as Minister of Health Gbedemah, Minister of Agriculture Botsio, and Minister of Transport and Communications Edusei have attempted to check Nkrumah's tendency to side with pro-bloc extremist elements. Most prominent among these is labor leader John Tettegah and Minister for Presidential Affairs Tawiah Adamafio. Among the general public, there has been a sharp reaction against the regime at all levels since early July, when a series of drastic new revenue measures designed to alleviate Ghana's growing fiscal problems was announced. The embassy believes that the full effect of this reaction may be yet to come. So far, however, no leadership has appeared to merge the various disaffected elements, apparently because of fear of imprisonment under Ghana's Preventive Detention Act--a fate which has already befallen many of Nkrumah's critics.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

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